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Abstract
Non-monotone incentive structures, which --- according to theory --- are able to induce optimal behavior,
are often regarded as empirically less relevant for labor relationships. We compare the performance
of a theoretically optimal non-monotone contract with a monotone one under controlled laboratory
conditions. Implementing some features relevant to real-world employment relationships, our paper
demonstrates that, in fact, the frequency of income-maximizing decisions made by agents is higher
under the monotone contract. Although this observed behavior does not change the superiority of the
non-monotone contract for principals, they do not choose this contract type in a significant way. This
is what we call the monotonicity puzzle. Detailed investigations of decisions provide a clue for solving
the puzzle and a possible explanation for the popularity of monotone contracts.
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1 Introduction
In the field of labor contracts, an important classi-
fication is the one ofmonotone and non-monotone
contracts. Monotone contracts grant higher pay to
workers with higher effort input or output, re-
spectively. As a consequence, the best performer
receives the highest pay. Under non-monotone
contracts this is not the case. Contract theory re-
searchhas shown that there are various contractual
relationships where monotone contracts are not
the optimal choice. The conditions --- the mono-
tone likelihood-ratio property and the convexity of
the distribution function --- are discussed byGross-
man andHart (1983), while the optimality of linear
contracts as a variant of monotone contracts is dis-
cussed by Christensen and Feltham (2005, ch.19),
Hart and Holmström (1987), or Holmström and
Milgrom (1987). Referring to multi-period prob-
lems which are the focus of our study, complemen-
tarities and/or correlation between periods can
also give rise to non-monotonicity in contracts.
Assume that the production outcome realized in
period 1 is positively correlated with the produc-
tion outcome realized in period 2. Assume further
that each outcome can be either low or high. The
employee (’agent’) influences the outcome by her
effort choice which also can be either low or high.
Due to the correlation between periods, a high
(low) outcome in period 1 will likely be followed
by a high (low) outcome in period 2. That is, the
probability to achieve a high outcome in period 2
is lower if the outcome in period 1 is low, and vice
versa. As a consequence, it takes a higher bonus
to motivate the agent to expend high effort if the
first period outcome had been low than if the first
period outcome had been high. Given the agent
succeeds in period 2 after a low outcome in pe-
riod 1, her realized bonus payment could be higher
than the one that she had achieved after a high
outcome in both periods. Such a non-stationarity
of the production technology (i.e., the interde-
pendency of period outcomes) represents a likely
feature of quite a number of settings where, e.g.,
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learning-on-the-job occurs (e.g., due to techno-
logical advance, organizational restructuring, or
employee turnover). A specific example would be
a marketing manager who learns about consumer
tastes in period 1 while already being in charge of
the company’s key accounts. The more she learns
in period 1 the more likely are high sales in period
1 and period 2. In the case she does not meet the
sales target in period 1, the marketing manager
appears poorly informed about consumer tastes.
High sales in period 2 are then rather uncertain.
Therefore, it takes high incentives to induce high
effort in period 2, and the state contingent pay-
ment resulting from a low outcome in period 1 and
a high outcome in period 2 will be higher than the
payment resulting from a high outcome in both
periods.
An argument in favor of monotone contracts is
the ‘free disposal of output’ assumption which
plays a major role in general equilibrium theory
(Arrow and Hahn 1980: 20). In fact, even output-
insensitive contracts can be optimal in settings em-
ploying this assumption (Nachman andNoe 1995).
However, with a stationary production technology
(i.e., independent periods), the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property (MLRP) and free disposal are
basically equivalent. If higher effort makes higher
outputs more likely (MLRP), the effort choice is
equivalent to an unrestricted form of free disposal
(Nachman and Noe 1995: 319). Now if that holds
for every period without dynamic (overlapping) ef-
fects, resulting optimal contracts are monotone in
output (Holmström andMilgrom 1987). However,
as our example illustrates, once the periods be-
come interdependent, monotone contracts do not
necessarily implement the theoretically optimal
solution.
For practical purposes, however, non-monotone
contracts are often deemed implausible. In fact,
monotone contracts are in frequent use while, to
our knowledge, there are only few non-monotone
contractual relations.Forexample, thereareecono-
metric studies indicating that non-monotone con-
tracts are used, but these studies do not focus
on individual contracts, but estimate certain para-
meters thereof (Prendergast 2002: 1077 et seq.;
Leonard 1990). The popularity of piece rates,
target bonuses as percentage of base salary, or
variable ratios or quotas (with constant targeted
level of performance) are evidence of linear con-
tracts. One possible reason for the predominance
of monotone contracts could be that, in order to
obtain non-monotonicity on an individual level,
individual performance needs to be rewarded. In
many of the employed profit-sharing plans, indi-
vidual performance is not measured or, at least,
not rewarded, however. In addition, concerns for
horizontal equity might prevent individual non-
monotone contracts because a violation of hori-
zontal equity may undermine employee motiva-
tion (Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 1988: 596). Mo-
tivated by this background, Lukas (2007a) directly
compares the performance of monotone and non-
monotone contracts in a controlled laboratory ex-
periment. He demonstrates that the majority of
employers, in fact, select the non-monotone con-
tract. Moreover, the majority of employees act as
income-maximizers (i.e., they choose high instead
of low effort) --- despite the non-monotonicity of
contracts. Our study builds on this research and
tries to close the gap between the empirically ob-
served predominance of monotone contracts and
the experimental evidence. To do that, we im-
plement an environment entailing some features
which are more natural for employment relation-
ships. Before presenting the details of our exper-
imental design, the next paragraph provides an
overview of related research.
Thewidespread use ofmonotone contracts in prac-
tice has led many authors to focus on these types
of contracts only. Among others, much theoretical
research has been carried out in the LEN frame-
work in agency theory where linear contracts al-
low for analytical tractability. Linear contracts are
a characteristic feature of the approach (Dutta
and Reichelstein 2003; Feltham and Xie 1994;
or Indjejikian and Nanda 1999). Recent exam-
ples include Sabac (2007) or Feltham and Hof-
mann (2007). Incentive effects of linear contracts
have also been analyzed in various empirical stud-
ies. Many of these investigations reveal a positive
correlation between monetary rewards and effort
(see, e.g., Bailey, Brown, and Cocco 1998; Lazear
2000; Sprinkle 2000), whereas others do not find
any positive effects (Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle, and
Young 2000; Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, and Shaw
1998). A positive relationship between rewards
and effort is also reported in experimental analy-
ses of contractual relationships (e.g., Fehr, Kirch-
steiger, andRiedl 1993, 1998), though the evidence
suggests that its degree is quite sensitive to the in-
stitutional setting (e.g., Van der Heijden, Nelissen,
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Potters, and Verbon 2001; Charness, Frechette,
and Kagel 2004). Models that try to account for
the observed behavior include some form of other-
regarding preferences like a concern for relative
payoffs (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000), some sort of reciprocity (e.g.,
Rabin 1993; Levine 1998; Falk and Fischbacher
1998), or both reciprocity and efficiency concerns
(Charness and Rabin 2002).
Many of the experimental studies in contract or
agency theory directly relate compensation to ob-
servable (and verifiable) effort inputs (see also
Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 2004; Falk and Gächter
2002; Huck, Seltzer, and Wallace 2004). Employ-
ment relationships featuring observability of effort
and making compensation dependent on effort
have to rely on subjective performance evaluation.
In spite of the growing literature on observable
effort inputs, most of the research in agency the-
ory assumes unobservability of the agents’ effort
choices and availability of verifiable performance
measures. Due to effort unobservability, in these
models of the principal-agent type, output is rel-
evant for compensation, while input only has an
indirect influence. The studies conducted by Güth,
Klose, Königstein, and Schwalbach (1998) and by
Anderhub, Gächter, and Königstein (2002) deal
with incentive effects of output-contingent pay
based on monotone contracts. Keser and Will-
inger (2000) allow for non-monotone contracts,
but these contracts do not represent (incentive-)
compatible offers. Lukas (2007a) provides the first
study on the effects of incentive compatible non-
monotone contracts. As mentioned above, some
features relevant for real-world employment rela-
tionships are not included in his study, however.
For example, employers adjust incentiveplansusu-
ally on an annual basis and, thus, do not need to
stick to an arrangement for all times. Moreover,
employees generally are free to leave their job
within certain restrictions of time, that is they
can effectively reject contract offers which they
deem unacceptable. We implement these features
in our experimental design and, thereby, move
the setting closer to reality. At the same time,
decision-making becomes easier for participants
because they get more information, more chances
to learn from experience, and the opportunity to
change their decisions if they want to. One might
speculate whether and how these features impact
decisions and outcomes. Given the increased ease
of decision-making, there might be even stronger
evidence in favor of non-monotone contracts.
In our experiment principals could choose between
a theoretically optimal non-monotone and a the-
oretically sub-optimal monotone contract. In line
with Lukas (2007a), our data demonstrate that
agents virtually never reject contract offers and of-
ten choosehigh effort as intendedby theprincipals.
This behavior turns out to be quite robust against
the different variations of our experimental design,
though it is more pronounced under themonotone
contract. The observed agents’ behavior does not
lead to higher expected payoffs for principals un-
der the monotone contract, however. In fact, the
expected payoff for principals is still higher under
the non-monotone contract. Accordingly, princi-
pals are predicted to select the non-monotone
contract. This is not what we observe. As such
our results shed light on the delicate interplay be-
tween incentives, behavior, and performance and
demonstrate that, despite the optimality of non-
monotone contracts, monotone contracts might
still be implemented --- a behavioral pattern which
we call the ‘monotonicity puzzle’. From our point
of view this puzzle can be resolved as follows: Ex-
periments with observable effort show a positive
correlation between effort and reward. If effort is
not observable, output is used to infer input and,
consequently, serves as a proxy for effort. Fair-
ness considerations, which have been identified
in observable effort experiments, would then sug-
gest monotone contracts so that higher effort ---
proxied by output --- leads to higher rewards. As
long as the theoretically optimal contract is indeed
monotone (in outcomes), the effort proxy will do
just fine. However, as soon as a non-monotone
contract is optimal the effort proxy leads to a sub-
optimal contract design. This is what we observe
in our experiment.
Our findings contribute to the research on agency
theory and on labormarkets by demonstrating that
agents tend to respond to the incentives given by
non-monotone contracts and, consequently, that
this type of contract may not be as implausible
as it is often regarded to be. Our observations on
principals, however,might help to understandwhy
this type of contract is rarely used in labormarkets,
nevertheless. The paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 contains a description of the contract
design and its implementation. In sections 3 and
4 we present the experimental design and derive
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our hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the results
on agents’ and principals’ behavior and the final
section concludes.
2 Design of contracts
Our experiment covers a situation, where a non-
monotone contract is optimal from a theoretical
perspective (see, e.g., the learning-on-the-job ex-
ample given in the introduction). The analytical
model underlying our contract design is adopted
from Lukas (2007b). According to this model, an
agent can choose between "effort" and "no effort"
in each of the two periods the contract lasts. The
agent’s effort decision affects the outcome distri-
bution. The principal is unable to observe and
verify the agent’s effort, so he relies on output-
contingent compensation. Given a binary output
set in each period --- the outcome can be either
low (L) or high (H) --- there are four different out-
come sequences ij, i, j = L,H, where x1 = xi indi-
cates first-period outcome and x2 = xj the second-
period outcome. Table 1 lists the probabilities to
achieve a given outcome sequence contingent on
the agent’s effort choices. They are obtained by
setting α = 2, β = 1, q = 2, e1 = 1, e0 = 0, p1 = 1,
and p0 = 0.68 in Lukas’ (2007b) model. Following
Lukas (2007b), let ei, i ∈ 0;1 indicate first-period
effort while pj, j ∈ 0;1 indicates second-period ef-
fort. The probability to achieve the high outcome
in period 1 equals
(1) P(x1 = xH) =
α + qei
α + β + q
,
and in period 2
(2) P(x2 | x1 = xH) = pj α + qei + 1α + β + q + 1
and
(3) P(x2 | x1 = xL) = pj α + qeiα + β + q + 1 ,
respectively. In the model α and β represent pa-
rameters of a beta distribution which are affected
by the agent’s effort and updating after observ-
ing first-period outcome following DeGroot (1970:
160).
For deriving the theoretical predictions, we as-
sume risk neutrality for both the principal and
the agent. Note that, there are a number of ex-
periments indicating that subjects tend to be risk-
averse. With our parametrization, risk-aversion
would not change the theoretical prediction re-
garding principals’ and agents’ behavior, however.
In fact, with risk-aversion, a principal would be
evenmore likely to choose the non-monotone con-
tract. Let sij denote the salary received by the agent
at the beginning of period 1 based on the outcome
sequence ij. The cost of exerting effort for the agent
is set equal to 0.45, i.e. exerting effort in both pe-
riods leads to effort cost of 0.90. Now optimal
payments (i.e., payments that induce high effort
by the agent in both periods at minimal costs) can
be calculated. For period 2, incentive-compatible
pay differences can be obtained by














⎢⎣ 2 · 0.45 − (0.8 · 0.83 − 0.4·0.34) · 1.7 − [(1 − 0.8) · 0.67 − (1−





With a zero reservation wage, resulting payments
are sLL = 0, sHL = 0.03, sLH = 2.05, and sHH =
1.73.
Such a pay schedule could have led to negative
payoffs for agents since providing effort in both
periods implies effort costs of 0.90, but realizing
the worst possible outcome sequence generates a
zero income. To ensure a non-negative payoff we
raise all payments by 0.90 (which does not af-
fect incentive compatibility). Theoretically, agents
facing binding incentive compatibility constraints
are assumed to select the action desired by the
principal. To provide sensible incentives in the
laboratory, another 0.35 is added to sLH , while sHL
is increased by 0.37 (which increases sHH by the
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Table 1: Contract structures
period 1 P(x1 = xH) period 2 P(x2 = xH | x1 = xH) P(x2 = xH | x1 = xL)
effort 0.8 effort 0.83 0.67
no effort 0.57 0.45
no effort 0.4 effort 0.50 0.33
no effort 0.34 0.23





Payments (7)-(10) represent contractN -- the non-
monotone contract in our experiment. By assump-
tion, the corresponding payments to the principal




P = 1.20, and
sHHP = 1.80, i.e x
L = 0.30, xH = 0.90. These pay-
ments to theprincipal ensure that ahighoutcome is
equally desirable for him irrespective of its timing.
Of course, many more incentive compatible con-
tracts could have been derived and possibly tested.
As the model is general in nature, its predictions
(should) hold for any particular contract solving
the principal’s problem.) In the experiment, con-
tract information about (non-)monotonicity is not
given to all participants alike. To have the same
labels in all treatments without indicating contract
properties, we labeled the non-monotone contract
as contract X and the monotone contract as con-
tract Y in the instructions. For exposition, we label
the contracts in the paper as N (non-monotone)
andM (monotone), respectively.
Contract M -- the monotone contract -- was ob-
tained by setting the agent’s payment sLH = 3.00





Consequently, the principal’s payments change to
sLHP = 1.60 and s
HH
P = 1.40. That is, to trans-
form an optimal non-monotone contract into a
monotone one, the principal needs to settle with
less given the most favorable outcome sequence
(xH , xH), but he receives more under an initially
less favorable sequence (xL, xH). Incentive com-
patibility is still preserved under the monotone
contractM.
Note that the probabilities to achieve each possible
outcome sequence do not depend on the contract.
They and the net payoffs under each contract are
illustrated in Fig.1 and explicitly given in Tables B
and B in Appendix B. Expected payoffs for the
agent can be easily calculated now.
2.1 Agent’s payoffs
By applying backward induction in expected pay-
offs to both contracts, we can deduce our hypothe-
ses. The following calculations refer to the game
trees given in Fig.1
Referring to stage-two decision nodes, Table 2 il-
lustrates the agents’ expected net payoffs under
contractN . These net payoffs can be used to deter-
mine the agent’s income-maximizing strategy in
stage 1 (decision nodeW ). Since the expected pay-
off when choosing ‘no effort’ (e 1.64) at this stage
is lower than the expected payoff when choosing
‘effort’ (e 1.79), the income-maximizing strategy
is to choose ‘effort’. That is, income-maximizing
agents under contract N choose ‘effort’ in stage 1
and ‘effort’ in stage 2. If an agent selects ‘no effort’
in stage 1 instead and reaches decision node NEL
or NEH , respectively, it is payoff-maximizing to
select ‘no effort’ in stage 2.
Table 2: Contract N. Expected net payoffs
to agent in stage 2 given stage-1 decision
expected payoff income-
node no effort effort maximizing
action
NEL 1.475 1.275 no effort
NEH 1.878 1.700 no effort
EL 1.575 1.675 effort
EH 1.819 1.811 (no effort)
Referring to stage-two decision nodes, Table 3
illustrates the agents’ expected net payoffs under
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0.60 1.20 0.60 1.20 1.20 1.80 1.20 1.80 0.60 1.20 0.60 1.20 1.20 1.80 1.20 1.80
0.90 3.40 0.45 2.95 1.30 3.00 2.550.85 2.100.402.550.852.500.002.950.45
The upper row contains payoffs for the first mover; the lower row the payoffs for the second mover.




0.60 1.60 0.60 1.60 1.20 1.40 1.20 1.40 0.60 1.60 0.60 1.60 1.20 1.40 1.20 1.40
The upper row contains payoffs for the first mover; the lower row the payoffs for the second mover.
0.90 3.00 0.45 2.55 1.30 3.40 2.950.85 2.500.402.950.852.100.002.550.45
(b) Contract M (monotone)
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contractM.
Table 3: ContractM. Expected net payoffs
to agent in stage 2 given stage-1 decisions
expected payoff income-
node no effort effort maximizing
action
NEL 1.383 1.143 no effort
NEH 2.014 1.900 no effort
EL 1.395 1.407 (effort)
EH 2.047 2.143 effort
Again, expected net payoffs can be used to deter-
mine the agent’s income-maximizing strategy in
stage 1. Since the expected payoff when choosing
‘no effort’ (1.64) at this stage is lower than the
expected payoff when choosing ‘effort’ (2.00), the
income-maximizing strategy is to choose ‘effort’.
That is, income-maximizing agents under contract
M also choose ‘effort’ in stage 1 and ‘effort’ in stage
2. If an agent selects ‘no effort’ in stage 1 instead
and reaches decision node NEL or NEH , respec-
tively, it is payoff-maximizing to select ‘no effort’
in stage 2 as well.
2.2 Principals’ payoffs
To predict principals’ choices, one can easily verify
that no contract dominates the other in terms of
first-order stochastic dominance or second-order
stochastic dominance for any effort strategy se-
lected by agents. Given the decisions of income-
maximizing agents, the expected payoffs for prin-
cipals selecting contractN ise 1.56 and for princi-
pals selecting contractM ise1.35. (Theprincipal’s
decrease in expected surplus of e 0.21 associated
with choosingM insteadofN is exactly the increase
of the agent’s expected surplus of e 0.21.)
3 Experimental design
We test five different treatments of the sequen-
tial principal-agent game with ten decision rounds
each. The basic set-up is as follows: The firstmover
(principal) has to choose between two similar, in-
centive compatible contracts N and M. Contract
N is characterized by the pay structure given in
(7)-(10), whereas (11)-(14) characterizes M’s pay
structure. That is, contract N awards the highest
payoff to the output sequence {low, high} and con-
tract M does so to the sequence {high, high}. The
contract choice determines the payoff for both the
first mover and the second mover (agent) for ev-
ery possible output sequence. The second mover’s
effort decision influences the probabilities of the
different possible output sequences. In order to get
enough observations for agents’ behavior in stage
2, we applied the strategy method when asking for
agents’ effort decision at this stage. That is, agents
had to state their effort decision for each of the
two possible outcomes that could result in stage 1.
Table 4 summarizes treatments and sample sizes.
Our first treatment is labeled ‘no framing with
selected contract information’ (NFS) and serves
as our baseline treatment. In NFS, an agent is
matched with the same principal in all ten rounds.
The principal decides on a contract once and for
all rounds and the agent receives information only
on the contract chosen by the principal, i.e. agents
are given a game-tree visualization of that contract
containing probabilities of success and respective
payoffs for both players (see Figures 1(a) and 1(b)).
The agent must accept the contract offered. ‘No
framing’means that subjects do not receive explicit
information on the (non-)monotonicity property
of the contract. In these respects, the treatment
NFS is comparable to the ’framing principal’ treat-
ment employed byLukas (2007a) inwhich framing
refers to labeling a principal an ’employer’ who se-
lects a contract (a feature which is also used in
our design); but in our treatment parameters were
chosen in a way that the non-monotonicity is more
explicit (i.e., in contract N), which increases prac-
tical relevance of results. Our controlled variations
of the baseline treatment allow us to investigate
the influence of different features that are not
only relevant to the labor-market context, but that
could also help to reduce the complexity of the
experimental situation. As such, the results might
explain the differences between the experimental
data obtained inLukas (2007a) and the empirically
observed predominance of monotone contracts.
The second treatment (‘framing with selected con-
tract information’, FS) differs from the first one
only in that additional information about the con-
tract type is given to the participants, i.e. con-
tracts are explicitly framed as either ‘monotone’
or ‘non-monotone’, respectively. The framing also
includes information about the agent’s net pay-
offs for outcome sequences (xL, xH) and (xH , xH)
based on the respective effort choices. Principals
receive this information for both contracts, while
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Table 4: Summary of treatments and sample sizes
Treatment Inform. on contract Opportunity to Matching # of # of independent obs.
type given to agents reject contract subjects agents principals
NFS none no fixed 40 20 20
FS for selected contract no fixed 38 19 19
FC for both contracts no fixed 38 19 19
FCR for both contracts no random 72 12 12
FCRR for both contracts yes random 72 12 12
agents receive it only for the contract selected by
their principal. None of the treatments investi-
gated in Lukas (2007a) contains information of
this kind. One might argue that the information
about contract properties should not affect behav-
ior since it could be derived from an inspection
of the numbers given in the contract. There are
two reasons why this does not have to be the case.
First, participants might perceive both contracts
as monotone contracts. A prominent example of
misperception despite readily available numbers
is represented by de Bartolome’s (1995) study on
average vs. marginal tax rates and people’s la-
bor supply decisions. Second, an explanation of
the characteristics of the contract and/or an vi-
sualization by tabulating numbers might ease the
understanding and can even be found in execu-
tive compensation contracts (e.g., Balsam 2002:
113). Hence, an explicit information on contract
properties may well matter.
In the third treatment (‘framing with complete in-
formation’, FC), agents receive the same informa-
tion as in treatment FS, but this time for both con-
tracts. That is, they receive information also about
the contractnot chosenby theprincipal.As in treat-
ment FS, information included game trees and the
explanation of the (non-)monotonicity property of
contracts. The variation in this treatment reflects
the fact that, in negotiations between employees
and employers, both usually know the characteris-
tics of the contracts available to the employer.
In the fourth treatment (‘framing with complete
information, random interaction’, FCR), agents re-
ceive the same information as in treatment FC, but
here the pairs of principal and agent are randomly
formed anew for each of the ten decision rounds.
This design allows principals to learn about the
consequences of their contract choice and it allows
agents to learn about the different principals’ de-
cisions as it is often the case in labor markets. This
design feature might further ease the participants’
understanding.
The fifth treatment (‘framing with complete infor-
mation, random interaction, and rejection oppor-
tunity’, FCRR) is the same as FCR, but additionally
includes the opportunity for agents to reject con-
tract offers. Such a rejection opportunity maps
real-life employees’ statutory right to quit an em-
ployment relationship at their will (although cer-
tain time restrictions may apply). Costs of contract
termination might be incurred by both parties: the
employer needs to fill in the vacant position which
might lead to costs for searching, costs for forgone
output, etc., and the employee needs to find a new
position which might lead to costs as well. That
people incur such costs to punish others (i.e., to
reduce the other’s payoff) is already known from
previous experimental research (see, e.g., the nu-
merous rejections of positive offers observed in
ultimatum bargaining experiments). Accordingly,
the opportunity to reject a contract might be used
as a means to punish the principal for his contract
choice. In our experiment, choosing the option to
reject in a certain round leads to a payment of e
0.50 in this round for the agent and the princi-
pal, respectively. Since contract M offers agents a
higher expected payoff than contract N, we expect
agents to reject contract N only, if they reject a
contract at all. Under contract N, agents’ expected
payoff ise 1.79, if they select effort in both periods,
and e 1.64 if not. Corresponding expected payoffs
for principals are e 1.56 and e 1.01, respectively.
As such, rejecting contract N constitutes a costly
punishment option for agents. Note that "punish-
ment by shirking" is available to the agent in every
treatment.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were
given a comprehensive presentation by one of the
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experimenters. The presentation was the same for
all treatments and was conducted by the same
experimenter. It included a detailed explanation
of the decision context and the game tree (with-
out the relevant payoffs) and exemplified of how
individual decisions influence outcome probabili-
ties and profits. For the latter, participants were
guided through the decision tree for each of the
two possible choices in period 1. Then subjects
were randomly assigned to their roles and to their
seats in the laboratory where they received writ-
ten instructions and, depending on the treatment,
sheets with contracts illustrated as game trees. The
structure of the game trees made it more easy to
realize (in addition to the explanation given by the
experimenter) that contracts differ only by payoffs
and not by the probability structure. 1 After read-
ing the instructions and during the course of the
experiment, subjects were given the opportunity
to privately ask clarifying questions. They were
neither allowed to ask questions in public nor to
communicate with other participants.
All experiments were conducted via computers us-
ing the zTree-software tool (Fischbacher 2007).On
their computer screen, subjects could see their own
decision(s), the outcomes of random draws made
by the computer, and the resulting payoffs. In ad-
dition, agents were informed about the principals’
decisions, while principals could not observe the
agents’ effort choices. That is, principals were only
informed about the payoff resulting in each round
and, in treatment FCRR, also about the agent’s
rejection decision. This corresponds to the funda-
mental assumption of unobservable effort made
in agency models. In treatments FCR and FCRR,
subjects were randomly re-matched in matching
groups consisting of six participants (i.e., three
principals and three agents). We made sure that
no two participants were matched with each other
in two subsequent rounds. Subjects were informed
accordingly.
All sessions were run at theMagdeburg Laboratory
for Experimental Economics (MaxLab) in June
2006 and in April and July 2007. A total of 260
students recruited viaORSEE (Greiner 2004) from
several courses at the University of Magdeburg
took part in the experiment. All students had either
passed pre-diploma examinations or completed a
1 Original instructions in German are provided as an online
supplement.
bachelor program. While recruiting participants,
we made sure that no student could take part
twice in the experiment. The sample size was 20
pairs of subjects in treatment NFS, 19 pairs of
subjects in each of the two treatments FS and FC,
and 36 principals and 36 agents (i.e., 12 matching
groups) in each of the two treatments FCR and
FCRR. Sessions lasted for about one hour; there
were no time constraints imposed on subjects’
decision-making. All subjects were anonymously
paid off after the experiment. No information was
given about the identity of other subjects. Average
earnings were e 13.77.
4 Hypotheses





tically depend on the sequence of effort inputs
(e1, e2) ∈ {0, 1}2. The probabilities of achieving
output sequence (x1, x2) conditional on input se-
quence (e1, e2), Prob((x1, x2) ‖( e1, e2)), are iden-
tical in each treatment. The same holds for net
payoffs under contract N andM, respectively (see
section 2). If a contract offer is rejected in treat-
ment FCR, both principal and agent have to settle
with a fixed payment of e 0.50 each and the deci-
sion round ends with the agent’s rejection.
As demonstrated in the last section, given the two
contracts’ incentive compatibility, income maxi-
mizing agents always choose ‘effort’ in stage 1 and
‘effort’ in stage 2. If an agent selects ‘no effort’
in stage 1 instead, it is always payoff-maximizing
to select ‘no effort’ in stage 2. Given the expected
payoffs resulting from income-maximizing behav-
ior, agents will not reject any contract offered.
(Note that rejecting a contract offer yields e 0.50.)
The corresponding hypotheses regarding agents’
behavior are as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (Agents; Contract Acceptance)
Given incentive compatibility of contract N and
contract M, if agents want to maximize their in-
come they will never reject a contract offer made
by principals.
Hypothesis 2 (Agents; Stage 1 Behavior)
If agents want to maximize their income they will
select ‘effort’ in stage 1.
Hypothesis 3 (Agents; Stage 2 Behavior)
If agents want to maximize their income they
will select ‘no effort’ in stage 2, if they selected
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‘no effort’ in stage 1. They will select ‘effort’ in
stage 2, given EL for contract N and given EH for
contract M. (As the difference in expected payoffs
in node EH for contract N is only e 0.008 and in
EN for contract M is only e 0.012, we consider
both possible choices as ‘income-maximizing’ in
the subsequent analysis.)
The hypothesis for income-maximizing principals’
behavior is as follows.
Hypothesis 4 (Principals; Contract Choice)
If principals want to maximize their income they
will always select the non-monotone contract.
5 Results of the experiments
In this section we will first present the analysis of
the principals’ decisions and then investigate the
agents’ behavior. If not indicated otherwise, one-
sided non-parametric tests are used and differ-
ences are labeled as significant ifp ≤ 0.025 and are
labeled as weakly significant if 0.025 < p ≤ 0.050.
5.1 Principals’ behavior
We observe, over all treatments, that in about
54 percent of all cases principals select the non-
monotone contract N . Treatment-specific num-
bers are given in Table 5 (treatments NFS, FS, FC,
FCR, FCRR) and illustrated in Fig.2 (FCR, FCRR),
respectively.
Although, theoretically, the non-monotone con-
tract N yields a higher expected payoff than the
monotone contract M, principals do not choose
contract N as often as expected. Applying the bi-
nomial test to principals’ choices in treatments
NFS, FS, and FC reveals that principals do not
select contract N in a statistically significant way.
Similar results can be obtained for principals’
choices per matching group for eight of the ten
rounds in treatmentsFCR andFCRR. In both treat-
ments the frequency of choosingN is almost never
significantly different from 50 percent (two-tailed,
one-sample t-test). This leads to conclusion 1.
Conclusion 1
In contrast toHypothesis 4, in all treatments prin-
cipals do not select the non-monotone contract N
in a statistically significant way.
At first sight, one could be tempted to think that
principals concerned over agents’ behavior at node

























EH might choose N not as often as predicted. At
this node, agents’ expected payoff from effort is
1.811, and the corresponding expected payoff from
‘no effort’ amounts to 1.819. (See also the remark
on payoff differences in Hypothesis 3.) But even
if agents strictly prefer ‘no effort’ at this node,
in terms of expected payoffs principals are still
better off with contract N (1.43) compared to M
(1.34). It follows that other motives must account
for observed principals’ behavior.
Another possible explanation is that principals are
willing to sacrifice some of their own payoff in
order to reduce the inequality between their and
the agents’ payoff. Recent theoretical and exper-
imental work provide reasons for this assump-
tion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002). In
our setting, however, choosing the monotone con-
tract M instead of the non-monotone contract N
even increases the payoff difference according to
the theoretical prediction (contract N: principal
1.56, agent1.79; contractM: principal1.35, agent
2.00). Considering agents’ actual choices does not
change this result for any of the five treatments.
In order to get amore detailed picture of principals’
behavior, we now turn to an analysis of individual
responses in treatments FCR and FCRR, where
principals repeatedly decide on a contract. As they
can only observe the outcomes of random draws
by the computer and the corresponding payments,
they do not know the agents’ effort choices. Infe-
rence from outcomes to action choices is limited
to knowing that high payoffs are more likely to
result from high effort instead of low effort. To get
further insights into individual choices and prefer-
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Table 5: Descriptive data on principals’ choices
NFS FS FC FCR FCRR
(i) Number of N-choices 11 11 9 199 202
(ii) Total number of choices 20 19 19 360 360
Percentage (i) / (ii) 55.0 57.9 47.3 55.3 56.1
Table 6: Descriptive data on principals’
individual choices
FCR FCRR
preference for... N M N M
(i) individual level 23 13 23 13
(ii) matching group level 6 6 7 5
ences for a contract type we determine the relative
frequency of selecting contractN on the individual
(or matching group) level. This frequency equals
the number of N-choices over the total number
of rounds. A frequency of at least 0.50 is called a
preference for N and a frequency of less than 0.50
is called a preference for M. Table 6 summarizes
the results.
Though the proportion of matching groups with
a preference for N is not significantly different
from 50 percent (Binomial test), it is instructive
to look at individual data. In both treatments, the
23 individuals with a preference for N account for
an average frequency of selecting N of 74 percent,
while the 13 individuals with a preference for M
show an average frequency of selectingN of just 25
percent (or 75 percent for contract M). This sug-
gests that participants have a soundunderstanding
of the task documented by frequent repetitions of
their decision.
Table 7 illustrates the development of individual
contract choices contingent on payoffs realized in
theprevious round. Sincewedonot find systematic
differences in individual responses between the
two contract types, the table aggregates data over
both contracts.
In general, we observe a tendency to stay with
the contract type chosen in the previous round.
This holds true for both events (‘winning’ and
‘losing’). If we find a change of behavior, this is
most likely in the case of losing. In treatment
FCR, particularly, the tendency to stay with the
previous contract becomes more pronounced over
time. The above findings indicate that principals’
behavior is dominated by inertia and additionally
guided by a form of the ‘Win-Stay-Lose-Change’
learning heuristic (cf. Nowak and Sigmund 1993).
Over the ten rounds of our experiment, this type of
individual ‘learning’ does not result in a change in
aggregate behavior, however.
There are no significant differences in principals’
behavior between the treatments.Neither the pres-
ence of a statement of the contract type, nor repe-
tition of the decision process by the principal, nor
the presence of an opportunity to reject the princi-
pals’ contract proposal has a significant influence
on principal’s contract choice.
5.2 Agents’ behavior
In treatment NFS, there are 11 agents confronted
with contract N (N-agents) and 9 agents con-
fronted with contractM (M-agents). In FS, the re-
spective numbers are 11 N-agents and 8M-agents
and, in treatment FC, there are 9 N-agents and 11
M-agents. In treatments FCR/FCRR, each agent
faces contractN on average 5.5/5.6 times and con-
tractM on average 4.5/4.4 times, respectively. The
following analysis distinguishes betweenN-agents
and M-agents. Note that the income-maximizing
effort choice in each decision node is identical
across contracts due to incentive compatibility.
For both contracts, income-maximization calls for
high effort in all nodes except NAN and NAH . Hy-
pothesis 3 points to a minor specification in node
EH under N and EL underM.
Income-maximizing behavior
Our first hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) is related to
agents’ contract acceptance decisions in treatment
FCRR. Of the 183 times that principals offer the
(non--monotone) contract N , only one offer is re-
jected; contractM (177 offers) is never rejected by
agents. Apparently, agents do not incur the cost
to punish the principal’s contract choice by de-
creasing his payoff to e 0.50. Conclusion 2 follows
immediately.
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Table 7: Principals’ individual responses to observed payoffs
(a) Treatment FCR
Response after round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
payoff < maximum (‘lose’) 0.78 0.83 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.75 0.78 0.64
stay with contract 0.50 0.53 0.59 0.72 0.78 0.66 0.78 0.86 0.74
change contract 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.28 0.22 0.34 0.22 0.14 0.26
payoff = maximum (‘win’) 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.36
stay with contract 0.75 0.83 1.00 0.73 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92
change contract 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
(b) Treatment FCRR
Response after round
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
payoff < maximum (‘lose’) 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.89 0.83 0.61 0.83 0.81
stay with contract 0.58 0.54 0.72 0.59 0.66 0.73 0.68 0.60 0.79
change contract 0.42 0.46 0.28 0.41 0.34 0.27 0.32 0.40 0.21
payoff = maximum (‘win’) 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.39 0.17 0.19
stay with contract 0.80 0.88 0.57 0.86 0.75 1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00
change contract 0.20 0.12 0.43 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00
Table 8: Number of individual agents or matching groups with relative frequency of
income-maximizing behavior of at least 50%
Stage NFS FS FC FCR FCRR
N M N M N M N M N M
1 8(11) 9(9) 11(11) 7(8) 6(9) 8(10) 7(12) 12(12) 9(12) 11(12)
2 3(11) 7(9) 6(11) 7(8) 6(9) 9(10) 9(12) 11(12) 9(12) 11(12)
1 + 2 1(11) 5(9) 3(11) 5(8) 3(9) 8(10) 3(12) 8(12) 3(12) 7(12)
Total number of individual agents or matching groups in parentheses. two underlines: significant (p ≤ 0.025); one underline:
weakly significant (0.025 < p ≤ 0.050; Binomial test)
Conclusion 2
In line with Hypothesis 1, in treatment FCRR
agents do not reject contract offers.
To obtain a first picture of individual choices (and
preferences for effort decisions), we calculate the
relative frequency of income-maximizing behavior
per contract type on the individual (or matching
group) level. This frequency equals the number
of rounds exhibiting income-maximizing behavior
over the total number of rounds. We call a relative
frequency of at least 50 percent a preference for
income-maximizing behavior; and of less than 50
percent a preference for non-income-maximizing
behavior. Table 8 demonstrates that, on the indi-
vidual or group level, there is a pronounced prefer-
ence for income-maximizing behavior. Apparently,
participants gained a sound understanding of the
task.
In order to analyze decisions within and between
treatments and contracts, we determine the rel-
ative frequency of individual income-maximizing
decisions per contract type and round (in treat-
ments FCR and FCRR the frequency refers to
matching groups). Recall that in these two treat-
ments, principals choose contracts anew in each
round and, thus, the number of agents in each
matching group facing contract N or M might
change over time. Accordingly, we calculated the
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frequency for each matching group based on the
actual number of agents facing the respective
contract type. The frequencies are obtained as
the number of individuals who reveal income-
maximizing behavior over the total number of in-
dividuals or as the averages of the twelve matching
groups’ percentage calculations, respectively. They
are illustrated in Figure 3.
Table 9 shows the number of rounds in which
we observe a significant majority of subjects (or
matching groups) displaying income-maximizing
behavior.
Table 9: Number of rounds with at least
weakly significant income--maximizing
behavior (number of significant cases in
parentheses)
(a) Contract N
Stage NFS FS FC FCR FCRR
1 1 (1) 4 (0) 0 (0) 3 (1) 2 (0)
2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 3 (3)
1 + 2 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
(b) ContractM
Stage NFS FS FC FCR FCRR
1 3 (3) 2 (1) 0 (0) 7 (7) 6 (5)
2 1 (1) 3 (3) 0 (0) 4 (3) 5 (2)
1 + 2 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 2 (0) 2 (1)
(We applied Binomial tests and t-tests for FCR and
FCRR, respectively.)
In only 20 percent of all cases (10 rounds out of 10
rounds × 5 treatments) we find significant income-
maximizing behavior for contract N in stage 1.
This number decreases to 8 percent in stage 2. For
contractM, the respective numbers are 36 percent
in stage 1 and 26 percent in stage 2. This leads to
the following conclusions:
Conclusion 3
In contrast to Hypothesis 2, only a minority of
subjectsmaximizes their incomeandselects ‘effort’
in stage 1.
Conclusion 4
At stage 2, we observe only a small number of
subjects behaving in line with Hypothesis 3.
Over the two stages, we do not observe any signi-
ficant incomemaximizing behavior for contractN ,
while for contract M in at least 5 of the 50 cases
subjects maximize their incomes. This observation
led us to analyze possible differences between the
two contract types.
Differences between contracts
Figure 4 displays the average frequency of income-
maximizing decisions over the two stages (stage
1+2) for contracts N and M. Applying a two-
tailed χ2-test on individual data (and a Mann-
Whitney-U-test on matching groups) reveals that
the monotone contract M performs significantly
better (in terms of income-maximization) than the
non-monotone contractN in 14 of the 50 cases (10
rounds × 5 treatments). Similar holds true for the
single stages, the respective number is 6 for stage
1 and 9 for stage 2. Our observations imply that
themaximin-criterion does not provide a complete
explanation. To see this, note that for N and M,
contract rejection yields e 0.50 and contract ac-
ceptance (based on themaximin-criterion) yields a
payoff ofe 0.90. To ensure this payoff, agentsmust
choose ‘no effort’ in stages 1+2. Given the observed
differences in behavior at stages 1+2, theremust be
additional influences that guide subjects’ behavior
here. At stage 2 (ignoring behavior in stage 1), the
maximin-criterion and income-maximization co-
incide for contract N , but not for contractM. We
find an increase of income-maximizing behavior
under contract M, however, which even contra-
dicts the maximin explanation.
A possible motive for the tendency to withhold
effort under contract N might be that agents want
to punish the principal for not selecting contract
M, which ismore favorable to them.However, only
6 out of 50 observations provide numbers which
are suggestive of such a motive.
Analyzing behavior aggregated over the first five
rounds and over the last five rounds reveals a
higher share of income-maximizing behavior un-
der the monotone contractM than under the non-
monotone contractN from the first roundson.This
difference in behavior between contracts seems to
increase over the rounds.
The previous results might suggest that, from a
principal’s point of view, contract M is preferable
since this contract induces ‘effort’ somewhat more
often than contract N does (see Figure 4 and Ta-
ble 9). This is not the case, however, as the above
result does not carry over to payoffs. In FS, FCR,
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Figure 3: Frequencies of income- maximizing agents’ behavior
Contract N, Stage 1
Contract M, Stage 1
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Figure 3 continued: Frequencies of income- maximizing agents’ behavior
Contract N, Stage 2
Contract M, Stage 2
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Figure 4: Frequency of income--maximizing decisions for the two contract types in stages












and FCRR, contract N still generates a signifi-
cantly higher payoff to principals than contractM
(p < 0.07, two-tailed exactMann-Whitney-U-test)
given observed choices by the agents.
In order to find an explanation for observed agents’
decisions, we investigate possible differences be-
tween treatments.
Treatment differences
We find significant differences regarding income-
maximizing behavior at stages 1+2 for contract
N between treatment NFS on the one hand and
treatments FCR and FCRR on the other (p < 0.05,
two-tailed exact Mann-Whitney-U-test). In par-
ticular, the combination of repetition and com-
plete information significantly increases income-
maximizing behavior. Ceteris paribus, non-mo-
notone contracts perform the better the less often
agents (employees) interact with the same princi-
pal. Interestingly, this effect is more pronounced
in the early rounds of the experiments. This sug-
gests that the effect results fromanticipation rather
than fromexperience.More detailed investigations
demonstrate that the observeddifferences in stage-
1+2 behavior are mainly caused by differences in
stage-2 behavior. Figure 5 presents the average in-
dividual frequency for each treatment and contract
type for stage 1, stage 2, and stages 1+2.
What do treatment differences teach us about the
appropriateness of non-monotone contracts? First
of all, we do not find treatment differences for
the monotone contract M. This suggests that the
awareness of a contract alternative that is inferior
from the agents’ point of view --- the non-monotone
contractN --- doesnot significantly change their be-
havior and it does not matter whether they repeat-
edly interact with different principals or whether
they are allowed to reject contract offers. Turning
to the non-monotone contract, treatment diffe-
rences exist between the NFS treatment and both
the FCR and FCRR treatment. Note that in the
latter two treatments an agent interacts with the
same principal less often than in the former treat-
ment. As employment relationships usually feature
repeated performance appraisals and correspon-
ding bonus payments, our results imply that non-
monotone contracts are likely to perform worse
than monotone ones --- given the agent knows that
there exists a better contract alternative. As such,
our results add some support for the prevalence of
monotone contracts.
6 Conclusion
Theoretical research in labor economics and con-
tract theory is often restricted to monotone or lin-
ear contracts, presumably because of the practical
popularity of these types of contract. Such a con-
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finement, however, neglects the fact that there are
cases where non-monotone contracts implement
optimal incentive structures, especially if the pro-
duction technology is non-stationary. Therefore,
more insights into the behavioral effects of non-
monotone contracts are needed. Lukas (2007a)
provides a first comparison of the performance
of monotone and non-monotone contracts un-
der controlled laboratory conditions. The observed
principals’ preference for non-monotone contracts
seems to be not in line with the predominance of
monotone contracts in labor market relationships,
however. This study is devoted to investigate this
monotonicity puzzle in more detail. In particular,
we compare incentive-compatible monotone and
non-monotone contracts in a setting where prin-
cipals are predicted to choose the non-monotone
one. In contrast to Lukas (2007a), our design in-
cludes some features that are not only more nat-
ural for employment relationships, but that might
also ease the understanding of the incentive struc-
tures. With these features, our results reveal more
income-maximizing agents under the monotone
contract than under the --- strategically equivalent
--- non-monotone contract. However, even with
agents’ higher efforts under the monotone con-
tract, principals’ expected payoffs remain higher
under the non-monotone contract. That is, princi-
pals are still expected to choose the non-monotone
contract. About every second principal chooses the
monotone contract, however.
Ruling out different explanations by our treatment
design and comparing our data with results from
Lukas (2007a), the findings suggest that princi-
pals prefer monotonicity because they proxy ob-
servable outcomes with unobservable effort which
leads them to choose themonotone contract (since
here the highest possible output is associated with
thehighest possible effort). This behavioral pattern
would result in a suboptimal design of contracts in
cases where incentive-compatibility calls for non-
monotone contracts. Furthermore, even in cases
where the theoretically optimal non-monotone
contract is chosen, it performs worse when agents
have to repeatedly choose their effort for the same
principal. Both results might explain why mono-
tone contracts are so popular in real-world labor
markets. Based on our findings, future laboratory
research might investigate the endogenous design
of contracts by giving principals an opportunity
to choose certain characteristics of the incentive
scheme. This would shed more light on the im-
portance of certain features of the contract de-
sign for inducing high effort. Since it turns out
that the alternatively available incentive scheme
might matter, it is also worthwhile to compare
the performance of non-monotone contracts with
other means to induce effort like promotion tour-
25
BuR -- Business Research
Official Open Access Journal of VHB
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V.
Volume 3 | Issue 1 | May 10 | 8--35
naments. Following this line of research requires
focusing on more than a single agent and, conse-
quently, taking ‘horizontal’ equity considerations
among agents into account. That these considera-
tions might play a role for behavior under group
incentive schemes has been demonstrated by, e.g.,
Schotter, Bull, and Weigelt (1987) or Nalbantian
and Schotter (1997). In particular, if agents tend to
compare actual effort-output relations among each
other as suggested by, e.g., Abeler, Altmann, Kube,
and Wibral (2006) or Gächter and Thöni (2009),
this comparison might be more unfavorable under
non-monotone contracts. This might be an addi-
tional reason for the pre-dominance of monotone
contracts in real-world labor markets.
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A Appendix: Instructions
A.1 Instructions in treatment NFS
First-mover instructions
Welcome to the experiment!
Introduction. You are about to take part in a lab-
oratory experiment to investigate individual be-
havior in decision-making. During the experiment
you participate in 10 repetitions (decision rounds).
You can earn money. How much money you will
earn depends also on your decisions. After the
experiment you will receive your entire payoff in
cash.
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Approximately five minutes after handing out the
instructions we will come to your seat to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions
during the experiment, please give us a sign and
we will come to your seat.
No participants will receive any information on the
identity and decisions of other participants during
the experiment.
Situation and decisions. You face the same situa-
tion in each of the 10 decision rounds.
You are part of a labor relation that lasts for 2
periods. You are the employer (first-mover). A
participant who will be randomly assigned to you
is the employee (second-mover). You select one
out of two similar contracts X and Y that will
be effective in all 10 decision rounds. By making
your contract choice you decide on the conditions
for output-contingent pay that the second-mover
receives and at the same time on the conditions for
your own payoff.
The second-mover will only be informed about
your contract choice (i.e. he will not receive any in-
formation on the contract that was not chosen) and
then decides whether he expends "effort" or "no
effort" in each of the two periods. The probability
of achieving a high output will be influenced by the
second-mover’s effort choice. A higher probability
of the high outcome is associated with "effort" than
with "no effort". If the second-mover selects "ef-
fort" in any period he incurs personal effort costs
of e 0.45; "no effort" does not lead to effort costs.
The second-mover’s first decision in point A deter-
mines whether he expends "effort" or "no effort".
In case he chooses "no effort" the low outcome
and the decision node NEL will be achieved with a
probability of 75%. The high outcome and the de-
cision nodeNEH will be reached with a probability
of 25%.
In case the second-mover selects "effort", the low
outcome and the decision node EL will be achieved
with a probability of 25%. The high outcome and
the decision node EH will be reached with a prob-
ability of 75%.
The second-mover’s first-period decision also af-
fects the outcome probabilities in period 2.
The second-mover’s second decision determines
whether he expends "effort" of "no effort" if he had
achieved the low outcome or the high outcome in
period 1. The relevant probabilities and the corre-
sponding net payoffs (personal costs are already
deducted) are given in the two decision trees for
contract X and contract Y, respectively.
Both participantsmake their decision sequentially.
You decide once on the contract, the second-mover
decides on his effort twice in each of 10 decision
rounds given the contract you selected.
The experiment is carried out on the computer.
The computer will determine the results in each
period by a random draw with the probabilities as
they are given in the decision tree.
Information. After each round the first-mover will
be informed about his current round payoff.
After each round the second-mover will be in-
formed about current round outcomes and his
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own payoff.
Second-mover instructions
Situation and decisions. You face the same situa-
tion in each of the 10 decision rounds.
You are part of a labor relation that lasts for 2 peri-
ods. A participant who will be randomly assigned
to you is the employer (first-mover). You are the
employee (second-mover). The first-mover selects
one out of two similar contracts X and Y that will
be effective in all 10 decision rounds. By making
his contract choice he decides on the conditions for
your output-contingent pay and at the same time
on the conditions of his own payoff.
You will only be informed about the contract cho-
sen (i.e. youwill not receive any information on the
contract that was not chosen) and then you decide
whether you expend "effort" or "no effort" in each
of the two periods. The probability of achieving a
high output will be influenced by the your effort
choice. A higher probability of the high outcome
is associated with "effort" than with "no effort". If
you select "effort" in any period you incur personal
effort costs of e 0.45; "no effort" does not lead to
effort costs.
Your first decision in point A determines whether
you expend "effort" or "no effort". In case you
choose "no effort" the low outcome and the deci-
sion node NEL will be achieved with a probability
of 75%. The high outcome and the decision node
NEH will be reached with a probability of 25%.
In case you select "effort", the low outcome and the
decisionnodeELwill be achievedwith aprobability
of 25%. The high outcome and the decision node
EH will be reached with a probability of 75%.
Your first-period decision also affects the outcome
probabilities in period 2.
Your second decision determines whether you ex-
pend "effort" of "no effort" if you had achieved the
low outcome or the high outcome in period 1. The
relevant probabilities and the corresponding net
payoffs (personal costs are already deducted) are
given in the decision tree.
Both participantsmake their decision sequentially.
The first-mover decides once on the contract, you
decide on your effort twice in each of 10 decision
rounds given the contract selected by the first-
mover.
The experiment is carried out on the computer.
The computer will determine the results in each
period by a random draw with the probabilities as
they are given in the decision tree.
Information. After each round the first-mover will
be informed about his current round payoff.
After each round the second-mover will be in-




Welcome to the experiment!
Introduction. You are about to take part in a labo-
ratory experiment to investigate individual behav-
ior in decision-making. During the experiment you
participate in 10 repetitions (decision rounds). You
can earn money. How much money you will earn
depends on your decisions. After the experiment
you will receive your entire payoff in cash.
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Approximately five minutes after handing out the
instructions we will come to your seat to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions
during the experiment, please give us a sign and
we will come to your seat.
No participants will receive any information on the
identity and decisions of other participants during
the experiment.
Situation and decisions. You face the same situa-
tion in each of the 10 decision rounds.
You are part of a labor relation that lasts for 2
periods. You are the employer (first-mover). A
participantwhowill be randomly assigned to you is
theemployee (second-mover).Youchoosebetween
two similar contracts X and Y that will be effective
in all 10 decision rounds. Your choice determines
the conditions for output-contingent pay that the
second-mover receives and at the same time on the
conditions for your own payoff.
The second-mover will only be informed about
your contract choice (i.e. he will not receive any in-
formation on the contract that was not chosen) and
then decides whether he expends "effort" or "no
effort" in each of the two periods. The probability
of achieving a high output will be influenced by the
second-mover’s effort choice. A higher probability
of the high outcome is associated with "effort" than
with "no effort". If the second-mover selects "ef-
fort" in any period he incurs personal effort costs
of e 0.45; "no effort" does not lead to effort costs.
The second-mover’s first decision in point A deter-
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mines whether he expends "effort" or "no effort".
In case he chooses "no effort" the low outcome
and the decision node NEL will be achieved with a
probability of 60%. The high outcome and the de-
cision nodeNEH will be reached with a probability
of 40%.
In case the second-mover selects "effort", the low
outcome and the decision node EL will be achieved
with a probability of 20%. The high outcome and
the decision node EH will be reached with a prob-
ability of 80%.
The second-mover’s first-period decision also af-
fects the outcome probabilities in period 2.
The second-mover’s second decision determines
whether he expends "effort" of "no effort" if he had
achieved the low outcome or the high outcome in
period 1. The relevant probabilities and the corre-
sponding net payoffs (personal costs are already
deducted) are given in the two decision trees for
contract X and contract Y, respectively.
Both participantsmake their decision sequentially.
You decide once on the contract, the secondmover
decides on his effort twice in each of 10 decision
rounds given the contract you selected.
Contract X is characterized by the fact that the
output-contingent pay of the second mover does
not rise monotonously in the output-level, i.e. the
outcome sequence {low; high} leads to a higher
payment than the output sequence {high; high} for
every possible combination of effort levels. Con-
tract Y, on the other hand, is characterized by the
fact that the outcome sequence {low; high} leads to
a lower payment than the output sequence {high;
high} for every possible combination of effort lev-
els.
The following examples will clarify this:
Effort Outcome net paym. net paym.
sequence 2nd mov. 2nd mov.
yes/no cont. X cont. Y
{yes; yes} { low; high} 2.5 2.1
{yes; yes} { high; high} 2.1 2.5
{no; no} { low; high} 3.4 3
{no; no} { high; high} 3 3.4
The experiment is carried out on the computer.
The computer will determine the results in each
period by a random draw with the probabilities as
they are given in the decision tree.
Information. After each round the first-mover will
be informed about his current round payoff.
After each round the second-mover will be in-
formed about current round outcomes and his
own payoff.
Payoff. With the completion of the 10 decision
rounds you will receive the sum of your payments
of every round in cash.
Second-mover instructions
Welcome to the experiment!
Introduction. You are about to take part in a labo-
ratory experiment to investigate individual behav-
ior in decision making. During the experiment you
participate in 10 repetitions (decision rounds). You
can earn money. How much money you will earn
depends on your decisions. After the experiment
you will receive your entire payoff in cash.
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Approximately five minutes after handing out the
instructions we will come to your seat to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions
during the experiment, please give us a sign and
we will come to your seat.
No participants will receive any information on the
identity and decisions of other participants during
the experiment.
Situation and decisions. You face the same situa-
tion in each of the 10 decision rounds.
You are part of a labor relation that lasts for 2 peri-
ods. A participant who will be randomly assigned
to you is the employer (first-mover). You are the
employee (second-mover). The first-mover selects
one out of two similar contracts X and Y that will
be effective in all 10 decision rounds. By making
his contract choice he decides on the conditions for
your output-contingent pay and at the same time
on the conditions of his own payoff.
You will only be informed about the chosen con-
tract (i.e. you will not receive any information on
the contract that was not chosen) and then you de-
cide whether you expend "effort" or "no effort" in
each of the two periods. The probability of achiev-
ing a high output will be influenced by your effort
choice. A higher probability of the high outcome
is associated with "effort" than with "no effort". If
you select "effort" in any period you incur personal
effort costs of e 0.45; "no effort" does not lead to
effort costs.
Your first decision in point A determines whether
you expend "effort" or "no effort". In case you
choose "no effort" the low outcome and the deci-
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sion node NEL will be achieved with a probability
of 60%. The high outcome and the decision node
NEH will be reached with a probability of 40%. In
case you select "effort", the low outcome and the
decision node EL will be achieved with a proba-
bility of 20%. The high outcome and the decision
node EH will be reached with a probability of 80%.
Your first-period decision also affects the outcome
probabilities in period 2.
Your second decision determines whether you ex-
pend "effort" or "no effort" if you had achieved the
low outcome or the high outcome in period 1. The
relevant probabilities and the corresponding net
payoffs (personal costs are already deducted) are
given in the decision tree.
Both participantsmake their decision sequentially.
The first-mover decides once on the contract, you
decide on your effort twice in each of 10 decision
rounds given the contract selected by the first-
mover.
The experiment is carried out on the computer.
The computer will determine the results in each
period by a random draw with the probabilities as
they are given in the decision tree.
Information. After each round the first-mover will
be informed about his current round payoff.
After each round the second-mover will be in-
formed about current round outcomes and his
own payoff.
Payoff. With the completion of the 10 decision
rounds you will receive the sum of your payments
of every round in cash.
The following information was given to partici-
pants if the principal selected contract X or con-
tract Y, respectively.
Contract X.
Contract X, which is chosen by the first mover, is
characterized by the fact that the output-contin-
gent pay of the second mover does not rise mono-
tonously in the output-level, i.e. the outcome se-
quence {low; high} leads to a higher payment than
the output sequence {high; high} for every possible
combination of effort levels.
The following examples will clarify this:
Effort Outcome net payment for
sequence second mover
yes/no with contract X
{yes; yes} { low; high} 2.5
{yes; yes} { high; high} 2.1
{no; no} { low; high} 3.4
{no; no} { high; high} 3
Contract Y.
Contract Y is characterized by the fact that the
outcome sequence {low; high} leads to a lower
payment than the output sequence {high; high} for
every possible combination of effort levels.
The following examples will clarify this:
Effort Outcome net payment for
sequence second mover
yes/no with contract Y
{yes; yes} { low; high} 2.1
{yes; yes} { high; high} 2.5
{no; no} { low; high} 3
{no; no} { high; high} 3.4
A.3 Treatment FC
First-mover instructions
Introduction. You are about to take part in a labo-
ratory experiment to investigate individual behav-
ior in decision making. During the experiment you
participate in 10 repetitions (decision rounds). You
can earn money. How much money you will earn
depends on your decisions. After the experiment
you will receive your entire payoff in cash.
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Approximately five minutes after handing out the
instructions we will come to your seat to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions
during the experiment, please give us a sign and
we will come to your seat.
No participants will receive any information on the
identity and decisions of other participants during
the experiment.
Situation and decisions. You face the same situa-
tion in each of the 10 decision rounds.
You are part of a labor relation that lasts for 2
periods. You are the employer (first-mover). A
participantwhowill be randomly assigned to you is
theemployee (second-mover).Youchoosebetween
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two similar contracts X and Y that will be effective
in all 10 decision rounds. Your choice determines
the conditions for output-contingent pay that the
second-mover receives and at the same time on the
conditions for your own payoff.
The second-mover will be informed about your
contract choice and about the contract you have
not chosen (i.e. he will receive all information on
each possible contracts) and then decides whether
he expends "effort" or "no effort" in each of the two
periods. The probability of achieving a high output
will be influenced by the second-mover’s effort
choice. A higher probability of the high outcome
is associated with "effort" than with "no effort". If
the second-mover selects "effort" in any period he
incurs personal effort costs of e 0.45; "no effort"
does not lead to effort costs.
The second-mover’s first decision in point A deter-
mines whether he expends "effort" or "no effort".
In case he chooses "no effort" the low outcome
and the decision node NEL will be achieved with a
probability of 60%. The high outcome and the de-
cision nodeNEH will be reached with a probability
of 40%.
In case the second-mover selects "effort", the low
outcome and the decision node EL will be achieved
with a probability of 20%. The high outcome and
the decision node EH will be reached with a prob-
ability of 80%.
The second-mover’s first-period decision also af-
fects the outcome probabilities in period 2.
The second-mover’s second decision determines
whether he expends "effort" of "no effort" if he had
achieved the low outcome or the high outcome in
period 1. The relevant probabilities and the corre-
sponding net payoffs (personal costs are already
deducted) are given in the two decision trees for
contract X and contract Y, respectively.
Both participantsmake their decision sequentially.
You decide once on the contract, the secondmover
decides on his effort twice in each of 10 decision
rounds given the information about both possible
contracts.
Contract X is characterized by the fact that the
output-contingent pay of the second mover does
not rise monotonously in the output-level, i.e. the
outcome sequence {low; high} leads to a higher
payment than the output sequence {high; high} for
every possible combination of effort levels. Con-
tract Y, on the other hand, is characterized by the
fact that the outcome sequence {low; high} leads to
a lower payment than the output sequence {high;
high} for every possible combination of effort le-
vels.
The following examples will clarify this:
(Remark: The second-moverwill get the same table
of contract information.)
Effort Outcome net paym. net paym.
sequence 2nd mover 2nd mover
yes/no w. cont. X w. cont. Y
{yes; yes} { low; high} 2.5 2.1
{yes; yes} { high; high} 2.1 2.5
{no; no} { low; high} 3.4 3
{no; no} { high; high} 3 3.4
The experiment is carried out on the computer.
The computer will determine the results in each
period by a random draw with the probabilities as
they are given in the decision tree.
Information. After each round the first-mover will
be informed about his current round payoff.
After each round the second-mover will be in-
formed about current round outcomes and his
own payoff.
Payoff. With the completion of the 10 decision
rounds you will receive the sum of your payments
of every round in cash.
Second-mover instructions
Welcome to the experiment!
Introduction. You are about to take part in a labo-
ratory experiment to investigate individual behav-
ior in decision making. During the experiment you
participate in 10 repetitions (decision rounds). You
can earn money. How much money you will earn
depends on your decisions. After the experiment
you will receive your entire payoff in cash.
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Approximately five minutes after handing out the
instructions we will come to your seat to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions
during the experiment, please give us a sign and
we will come to your seat.
No participants will receive any information on the
identity and decisions of other participants during
the experiment.
Situation and decisions: You face the same situa-
tion in each of the 10 decision rounds.
You are part of a labor relation that lasts for 2 peri-
ods. A participant who will be randomly assigned
to you is the employer (first-mover). You are the
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employee (second-mover). The first-mover selects
one out of two similar contracts X and Y that will
be effective in all 10 decision rounds. By making
his contract choice he decides on the conditions for
your output-contingent pay and at the same time
on the conditions of his own payoff.
Youwill be informedabout the chosen contract and
about the contract that was not chosen (i.e. youwill
get all information about each possible contract).
Thenyoudecidewhetheryouexpend"effort" or "no
effort" in each of the two periods. The probability
of achieving a high output will be influenced by
your effort choice. A higher probability of the high
outcome is associated with "effort" than with "no
effort". If you select "effort" in any period you incur
personal effort costs ofe 0.45; "no effort" does not
lead to effort costs.
Your first decision in point A determines whether
you expend "effort" or "no effort". In case you
choose "no effort" the low outcome and the deci-
sion node NEL will be achieved with a probability
of 60%. The high outcome and the decision node
NEH will be reached with a probability of 40%. In
case you select "effort", the low outcome and the
decision node EL will be achieved with a proba-
bility of 20%. The high outcome and the decision
node EH will be reached with a probability of 80%.
Your first-period decision also affects the outcome
probabilities in period 2.
Your second decision determines whether you ex-
pend "effort" or "no effort" if you had achieved the
low outcome or the high outcome in period 1. The
relevant probabilities and the corresponding net
payoffs (personal costs are already deducted) are
given in the decision tree.
Both participantsmake their decision sequentially.
The first-mover decides once on the contract, you
decide on your effort twice in each of 10 decision
rounds given the contract selected by the first-
mover.
Contract X is characterized by the fact that the
output-contingent pay of the second mover does
not rise monotonously in the output-level, i.e. the
outcome sequence {low; high} leads to a higher
payment than the output sequence {high; high} for
every possible combination of effort levels. Con-
tract Y, on the other hand, is characterized by the
fact that the outcome sequence {low; high} leads to
a lower payment than the output sequence {high;
high} for every possible combination of effort le-
vels.
The following examples will clarify this:
Effort Outcome net paym. net paym.
sequence 2nd mover 2nd mover
yes/no w. cont. X w. cont. Y
{yes; yes} { low; high} 2.5 2.1
{yes; yes} { high; high} 2.1 2.5
{no; no} { low; high} 3.4 3
{no; no} { high; high} 3 3.4
The experiment is carried out on the computer.
The computer will determine the results in each
period by a random draw with the probabilities as
they are given in the decision tree.
Information. After each round the first-mover will
be informed about his current round payoff.
After each round the second-mover will be in-
formed about current round outcomes and his
own payoff.
Payoff. With the completion of the 10 decision
rounds you will receive the sum of your payments
of every round in cash.
A.4 Treatment FCR
First-mover instructions
Welcome to the experiment!
Introduction. You are about to take part in a labo-
ratory experiment to investigate individual behav-
ior in decision making. During the experiment you
participate in 10 repetitions (decision rounds). You
can earn money. How much money you will earn
depends on your decisions. After the experiment
you will receive your entire payoff in cash.
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Approximately five minutes after handing out the
instructions we will come to your seat to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions
during the experiment, please give us a sign and
we will come to your seat.
No participants will receive any information on the
identity and decisions of other participants during
the experiment.
Situation and decisions. You face the same situa-
tion in each of the 10 decision rounds.
You are part of a labor relation that lasts for 2 pe-
riods. You are the employer (first-mover). In each
decision round a participant will be randomly as-
signed to you. He is the employee (second-mover).
At the beginning of each decision round you choose
between two similar contracts X andY. Your choice
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determines the conditions for output-contingent
pay that the second-mover receives and at the
same time on the conditions for your own payoff.
The second-mover will be informed about your
contract choice and about the contract you have
not chosen (i.e. he will receive all information on
each possible contracts) and then decides whether
he expends "effort" or "no effort" in each of the two
periods. The probability of achieving a high output
will be influenced by the second-mover’s effort
choice. A higher probability of the high outcome
is associated with "effort" than with "no effort". If
the second-mover selects "effort" in any period he
incurs personal effort costs of e 0.45; "no effort"
does not lead to effort costs.
The second-mover’s first decision in point A deter-
mines whether he expends "effort" or "no effort".
In case he chooses "no effort" the low outcome
and the decision node NEL will be achieved with a
probability of 60%. The high outcome and the de-
cision nodeNEH will be reached with a probability
of 40%.
In case the second-mover selects "effort", the low
outcome and the decision node EL will be achieved
with a probability of 20%. The high outcome and
the decision node EH will be reached with a prob-
ability of 80%.
The second-mover’s first-period decision also af-
fects the outcome probabilities in period 2.
The second-mover’s second decision determines
whether he expends "effort" or "no effort" if he had
achieved the low outcome or the high outcome in
period 1. The relevant probabilities and the corre-
sponding net payoffs (personal costs are already
deducted) are given in the two decision trees for
contract X and contract Y, respectively.
Both participantsmake their decision sequentially.
First you decide on the contract, the second-mover
then will decide on his effort twice knowing both
contract types which were available. This sequence
will be the same in each of the 10 decision rounds.
Contract X is characterized by the fact that the
output-contingent pay of the second mover does
not rise monotonously in the output-level, i.e. the
outcome sequence {low; high} leads to a higher
payment than the output sequence {high; high} for
every possible combination of effort levels. Con-
tract Y, on the other hand, is characterized by the
fact that the outcome sequence {low; high} leads to
a lower payment than the output sequence {high;
high} for every possible combination of effort le-
vels.
The following examples will clarify this:
Effort Outcome net paym. net paym.
sequence 2nd mover 2nd mover
yes/no w. cont X w cont Y
{yes; yes} { low; high} 2.5 2.1
{yes; yes} { high; high} 2.1 2.5
{no; no} { low; high} 3.4 3
{no; no} { high; high} 3 3.4
The experiment is carried out on the computer.
The computer will determine the results in each
period by a random draw with the probabilities as
they are given in the decision tree.
Information. After each round the first-mover will
be informed about his current round payoff.
After each round the second-mover will be in-
formed about current round outcomes and his
own payoff.
Payoff. With the completion of the 10 decision
rounds you will receive the sum of your payments
of every round in cash.
Second-mover instructions
Welcome to the experiment!
Introduction. You are about to take part in a labo-
ratory experiment to investigate individual behav-
ior in decision making. During the experiment you
participate in 10 repetitions (decision rounds). You
can earn money. How much money you will earn
depends on your decisions. After the experiment
you will receive your entire payoff in cash.
Please read the following instructions carefully.
Approximately five minutes after handing out the
instructions we will come to your seat to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions
during the experiment, please give us a sign and
we will come to your seat.
No participants will receive any information on the
identity and decisions of other participants during
the experiment.
Situation and decisions. You face the same situa-
tion in each of the 10 decision rounds.
You are part of a labor relation that lasts for 2
periods. In each decision round a participant will
be randomly assigned to you. He is the employer
(first-mover) and you are the employee (second-
mover). The first-mover selects one out of two
similar contracts X and Y that will only be effec-
tive in this decision round. By making his con-
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tract choice he decides on the conditions for your
output-contingent pay and at the same time on the
conditions of his own payoff.
Youwill be informedabout the chosen contract and
about the contract that was not chosen (i.e. youwill
get all information about each possible contract).
Then you have to decide whether you expend "ef-
fort" or "no effort" in each of the two periods. The
probability of achieving a high output will be influ-
enced by your effort choice. A higher probability of
the high outcome is associated with "effort" than
with "no effort". If the second-mover selects "ef-
fort" in any period he incurs personal effort costs
of e 0.45; "no effort" does not lead to effort costs.
Your first decision in point A determines whether
you expend "effort" or "no effort". In case you
choose "no effort" the low outcome and the deci-
sion node NEL will be achieved with a probability
of 60%. The high outcome and the decision node
NEH will be reached with a probability of 40%. In
case you select "effort", the low outcome and the
decision node EL will be achieved with a proba-
bility of 20%. The high outcome and the decision
node EH will be reached with a probability of 80%.
Your first-period decision also affects the outcome
probabilities in period 2.
Your second decision determines whether you ex-
pend "effort" or "no effort" if you had achieved the
low outcome or the high outcome in period 1. The
relevant probabilities and the corresponding net
payoffs (personal costs are already deducted) are
given in the decision tree.
Both participantsmake their decision sequentially.
The first-mover chooses the contract, then you
decide on your effort twice knowing both contract
types which were available. This sequence will be
the same in each of the 10 decision rounds.
Contract X is characterized by the fact that the
output-contingent pay of the second mover does
not rise monotonously in the output-level, i.e. the
outcome sequence {low; high} leads to a higher
payment than the output sequence {high; high} for
every possible combination of effort levels. Con-
tract Y, on the other hand, is characterized by the
fact that the outcome sequence {low; high} leads to
a lower payment than the output sequence {high;
high} for every possible combination of effort lev-
els.
The following examples will clarify this:
Effort Outcome net paym. net paym.
sequence 2nd mover 2nd mover
yes/no cont. X cont. Y
{yes; yes} { low; high} 2.5 2.1
{yes; yes} { high; high} 2.1 2.5
{no; no} { low; high} 3.4 3
{no; no} { high; high} 3 3.4
The experiment is carried out on the computer.
The computer will determine the results in each
period by a random draw with the probabilities as
they are given in the decision tree.
Information. After each round the first-mover will
be informed about his current round payoff.
After each round the second-mover will be in-
formed about current round outcomes and his
own payoff.
Payoff. With the completion of the 10 decision
rounds you will receive the sum of your payments
of every round in cash.
B Appendix: Tables
Table B1: Probabilities of net payoffs
effort output sequence
(xL, xL) (xH , xL) (xL, xH) (xH , xH)
(0,0) 0.463 0.264 0.138 0.136
(0,1) 0.402 0.200 0.198 0.200
(1,0) 0.110 0.344 0.090 0.456
(1,1) 0.066 0.136 0.134 0.664
Table B2: State contingent payoffs (in e)
under different contracts
contract contract
N M N M
2nd mover 1st mover
output seq. (agent) (principal)(
xL, xL
)
0.90 0.90 0.60 0.60(
xH , xL
)
1.30 1.30 1.20 1.20(
xL, xH
)
3.40 3.00 1.20 1.60(
xH , xH
)
3.00 3.40 1.80 1.40
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